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Abstract
This study examines the prevailing conditions of low inflation and liquidity trap 
that characterize major advanced economies. Despite the strong commitment to 
unconventional monetary policies and provision of ample liquidity through zero-
interest rate policies and quantitative easing, there is a clear failure by central bankers 
to achieve the two-percent inflation targets. This paper discusses the dynamics of 
inflation rates and real economic growth, and considers the theoretical arguments 
about the liquidity trap. It focuses on the expansionary monetary policies adopted 
by the Bank of Japan in its extensive attempts to shape inflation expectations, and 
address the long-term effects of the balance-sheet recessions. Thus, it can be argued 
that the focus on liquidity trap and monetary easing may be misplaced, as the 
central issue relates to debt accumulation, leveraging, moral hazards, misalignment 
of incentives, and misallocation of resources rather than the dynamics of the yield 
curve. It is perhaps the risk-sharing relations rather than risk-transfer relations based 
on interest rates, that is more conducive to financial stability and more efficient 
allocation of risk in the society.
1. Introduction
The prospects of low-inflation trap have increased despite the repeated efforts from central banks 
in Japan and many advanced countries to achieve inflation targets. Central banks around the 
world have the principal mandate of achieving price stability. The average euro inflation rate 
following the inception of the European Central Bank (ECB) has not exceeded the two-percent 
threshold. Price stability is a long-term objective, but the efforts to manage inflation expectations 
are often justified by strong concerns about the dangers of deflationary pressures, and very low 
inflation rates.
 Conventional wisdom implies that expansionary monetary policies are conducive to higher 
inflation given the increase in the money supply. The fact that many advanced economies, and 
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in particular Japan, are still concerned with the prospects of deflation, and the persistence of 
low inflation expectations, indicates that monetary easing has only provided ample liquidity, 
but inflation remains elusive. Several rounds of quantitative and qualitative easing programs, 
in addition to the near-zero interest rate policies, seem to have failed to create an inflationary 
environment. There may be serious problems with the transmission channels of monetary policy, 
demand and supply of money, aggregate employment and fixed capital investment, and ultimately 
the behaviour of prices not only in the goods and services markets but in financial asset markets 
as well.
 This paper examines the low-inflation trap conditions in light of the expansionary monetary 
policies pursued in the Japanese post-bubble stagnation and the aftermath of U.S. financial crisis. 
It considers also the impact of monetary policy on price fluctuations in financial markets. The 
focus is placed on the monetary policy measures undertaken by the Bank of Japan. The next 
section presents a brief analysis of the history of inflation and economic growth rates and future 
projections for advanced economies and developing economies. Section 3 discusses briefly some 
theoretical issues related to liquidity trap. Section 4 addresses the expansionary monetary policies 
based on zero-interest rates and quantitative easing programs. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Analysis of the relation between economic growth and inflation
It is possible to understand the historical relation between inflation and growth rates with reference 
to Figures 1, 2 and 3, which report the time-series of inflation rates as well as real GDP growth 
rates for the world economy, major advanced economies, and emerging market and developing 
economies, respectively. The historical values are based on average consumer prices, with annual 
percentage changes over the period from 1980 and 2019. The estimates and projections by the 
International Monetary Fund (2019) for the subsequent five-year period from 2020 to 2024 are 
based on the statistical information set available until September 2019. It is clear from Figure 1 
that, historically, the benchmark inflation rate for the world economy reached its highest levels 
around 40 percent in the early 1990s, but remained at single-digit levels afterward. The historical 
rate of economic growth remained positive over the whole period, and reached its peak ahead 
of the U.S. financial crisis before recovering to levels comparable to the pre-crisis rates of global 
growth rates in economic output.
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Figure 1- Inflation and economic growth rates for advanced economies
Source: Author’s chart based on IMF statistics 2019
 It appears also that the relation between inflation and economic growth rates is similarly 
structured for emerging market and developing economies, as shown in Figure 2. These economies 
seem to follow similar patterns of simultaneously decreasing inflation and economic growth rates. 
There is however a tendency for extremely higher inflation rates over the decade running from 
1989 to 1998, which seems to exert strong influence on the behaviour of inflation rates for the 
world economy. The real GDP rates of growth for emerging market and developing economies 
follow also similar patterns as the behaviour of growth rates for the world economy. It seems 
however that the rates of growth for the latter remain lower than for developing economies, which 
may be a natural result of lower growth rates for more advanced economies.
Figure 2- Inflation and economic growth rates for advanced economies
Source: Author’s chart based on IMF statistics 2019
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 Judging from Figure 3, there is a more synchronous behaviour of inflation and growth rates 
for the G7 advanced economies. Indeed, with the exception of the early 1980s where a wider gap 
between higher inflation rates and lower growth rates can be observed, both rates seem to move 
in tandem. The U.S. financial crisis provides a clear demonstration of the strong tendency for 
both inflation and growth rates to fall simultaneously in association with expectations of lower 
consumption and lower investment.
Figure 3- Inflation and economic growth rates for advanced economies
Source: Author’s chart based on IMF statistics 2019
 It is possible to understand the dynamics of inflation and growth rates using the average values 
during different subperiods from 1980 to 2019. It is clear from Table 1 that inflation rates were 
highest in the 1980s for the major advanced economies, but in the 1990s for the world economy 
and emerging market and developing economies. A monotonous decrease in average inflation 
rates is observed over the 2000s and 2010s for each of the analytical groups. The mean values for 
economic growth rates present a slightly different picture.  Growth rates are, on average, highest 
in the 1980s for major advanced economies, but in the 1990s for the World economy as well as 
the emerging market and developing economies. Over the three decades from the 1980s to 2000s, 
there seems to be, indeed, a gradual deceleration in average economic growth for major advanced 
economies, which stands in sharp contrast with the gradual acceleration for world economies and 
emerging market and developing economies.
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Table 1- Average annual inflation and economic growth rates
Sample period World 
economy
Emerging-market 
and developing 
economies
Major 
advanced 
economies
Inflation rates （%）
1980–1989 15.78 36.56 5.58
1990–1999 20.11 54.92 2.60
2000–2009  4.22  6.84 1.90
2010–2019  3.56  5.16 1.53
2020–2024*  3.48  4.46 1.96
Economic growth rates （%）
1980–1989  3.16  3.20 3.00
1990–1999  3.11  3.63 2.49
2000–2009  3.89  6.09 1.43
2010–2019  3.76  5.11 1.89
2020–2024*  3.56  4.76 1.40
Source: Author’s chart based on IMF statistics 2019
Note: * IMF projections for the period 2020–2024 are based on working hypotheses about real 
effective exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policies for selected economies, and average oil prices, 
inter alia.
 It is important to note from the results reported in Table 1, that it is only after the 1990s 
that single-digit rates of economic growth are matched with single-digit rates of inflation for all 
groups. Sluggish economic growth is naturally accompanied with lower rates of inflation. It is 
clear that inflation rates for major advanced economies did not, on average, exceed the threshold 
of two percent, which represents the inflation target for many central banks. The projections of the 
International Monetary Fund (2019), which are also reported in the figures above, inflation rates 
are expected to increase and approach the two-percent threshold for major advanced economies 
for the period 2020–2024. In contrast, there are expectations for falling inflation for the alternative 
groups. The persistence in lower inflation for the world economy and developing economies is also 
associated with expectations of lower economic growth prospects. Indeed, economic growth is 
expected to remain sluggish, with the average economic rate hovering between 1.3 and 1.6 percent 
for advanced economies. There are, however, expectations of relatively higher growth rates of 
around 4.76 for developing economies, and 3.56 for the world economy.
 It can be argued that global economic activity remains weak and the momentum is strong 
for economies to perform below expectations. With reference to the Bank for International 
Settlements (2019), weaker performance can be explained by political uncertainty, which 
continues to exert downward pressures on investment. Trade tensions and rising trade barriers 
remain a significant source of uncertainty. There are growing concerns about the high leverage 
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conditions in the Chinese financial system, and the over-reliance of emerging market economies 
on foreign-currency financing, with the stronger dollar adding further pressure as a result of the 
tightening or “normalisation” of the U.S. monetary policy.
 It is noted also that prices have not increased to the extent of lifting inflation above target 
levels despite the higher levels of employment. Thus, further analysis of economic growth and 
inflation should take into consideration the nature of economic cycles. Indeed, the BIS (2019) 
argues that “Less appreciated is the fact that ever since inflation has been low and stable, starting 
some three decades ago, the nature of business fluctuations has changed. Until then, it was sharply 
rising inflation, and the subsequent  monetary policy tightening, that ushered in downturns. Since 
then, financial expansions and contractions have played a more prominent role.” (BIS Annual 
Economic Report 2019, p. x)
3. Theory of liquidity trap
Faced with sluggish demand, weaker economic growth, low inflation or deflationary pressures, 
the traditional response from central banks is to lower the short-term nominal interest rate. 
Expectations of lower nominal rates are conducive to expectations of lower real interest rates, 
which have the potential of providing stronger incentives for consumption and aggregate demand, 
and thereby increased real investment and output. This in turn, would increase the expectations 
of higher inflation. These policy measures may be effective when nominal interest rates can be 
reduced and transmission channels are effective. But when the level of nominal rates is close 
to zero, there is very little room for further reduction, and monetary easing under zero-interest 
rates can be conducive to increased money supply without achieving the inflation target. Thus, 
a liquidity trap can be understood in terms of expansionary monetary policies, which despite 
rising of money supply and liquidity levels remains associated with persistent deflationary or low-
inflationary pressures. Expansionary monetary policy becomes impotent insofar that increased 
money supply and higher liquidity have no significant impact on the equilibrium price levels and 
inflation expectations.
 The Keynesian economics describe a liquidity trap as a significant increase in liquidity 
preference from investors, which is due to uncertainty about the future direction of interest rates, 
and future yield on capital assets. The likelihood of liquidity traps is higher in the aftermath of 
asset bubbles, with investment rising during booms and falling during recessions. Indeed, Keynes 
(1936) notes that “[i]t is of the nature of organized investment markets, under the influence of 
purchasers largely ignorant of what they are buying and of speculators who are more concerned 
with forecasting the next shift of market sentiment than with a reasonable estimate of the future 
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yield of capital assets, that, when disillusion falls upon an over-optimistic and over-bought 
market, it should fall with sudden and catastrophic force.” (pp. 315–316). This argument reflects 
the crucial role played by market sentiment in the formation of asset bubble and their subsequent 
burst. Shifts in market sentiment can be explained by economic shocks and changes in investors’ 
perceptions affect, in turn, expectations about the future demand for money and future yield of 
capital goods.
 Thus, the likelihood of liquidity trap is intrinsically related to the formation of asset bubbles 
and onset of crises. Further insights from The General Theory suggest that “the dismay and 
uncertainty as to the future which accompanies a collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital 
naturally precipitates a sharp increase in liquidity-preference –and hence a rise in the rate of 
interest. Thus the fact that a collapse in the marginal efficiency of capital tends to be associated 
with a rise in the rate of interest may seriously aggravate the decline in investment.” (Keynes, 
1936, p. 316).
 The classical discussion of the liquidity trap is typically made within the IS-LM analytical 
framework, which describes the equilibrium relation between output and interest rates. The 
downward-sloping investment-saving (IS) function indicates the tendency for lower interest rates 
to increase the demand for goods, whereas the upward-sloping liquidity-preference money supply 
(LM) function indicates the propensity for higher income to increase interest rates. Bearing in 
mind that the LM curve is responsive to monetary policies whereas the IS curve reflects the 
impact of fiscal policies, it is possible to consider the market conditions for goods and financial 
assets that are characteristic of a liquidity trap.1
 Following Krugman (2000), it is clear from Figure 4 that the elasticity of the demand for 
money becomes infinite under zero or near-zero interest rates, as reflected by the flat segment 
of LM curve. The equilibrium conditions, where the IS line traverses the LM curve, imply that, 
independent of changes in money supply, monetary policy has no substantial effects on output 
and interest rates. The futility of monetary policy measures aimed at increasing the price level or 
inflation rate is precisely the result of the flatness of the LM curve at the region where it meets 
with the IS function. Thus, given the difficulties to lower interest rates below the zero threshold, 
1 In their critique of the liquidity trap, Beranek and Timberlake (1987) argue that “Keynes provided three distinct 
statements of a trap: a “weak” version, a “strong” version, and an “extreme” case. The “weak” version argues that, while 
elasticity of liquidity preference becomes very high at low rates of interest, it does not become infinite. The “strong” 
version envisions a finite segment over which the liquidity preference function is perfectly elastic. Appearing in many 
textbooks is the “extreme” form, which defines a true trap in the sense that the rate of interest cannot be reduced further 
by appropriate increases in the stock of money. By way of contrast, the weak form does not lead to a true trap, while the 
strong version can lead to a condition which may be labelled a trap of sorts.” (p. 387).
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conventional monetary easing and open-market operations may become ineffective as bonds no 
longer dominate cash, and the incentives for saving dominate investment.
Figure 4- Infinite elasticity of the demand of money under zero-interest rate policy
 In contrast to the Keynesian IS-LM perspectives, Krugman (2000) proposes an alternative 
theoretical description of liquidity trap that relates the levels of current and future consumption 
to interest rates. Assuming that the representative individual is to maximize the utility function
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discount factor D and relative risk aversion ρ, as follows.
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 It is clear from the equation above that the nominal rate of interest i is a decreasing function 
of the price level P. Thus, given an increase in the nominal interest rate, price deflation is required 
to maintain the real rate of interest unchanged. The equilibrium interest rate is determined at the 
intersection of the IS curve with the LM curve, which satisfies the condition that Pc = M, where 
M denotes the money supply. It is also possible to consider the theoretical conditions that imply 
a negative rate of interest. As shown in Figure 5 following again Krugman (2000), the IS curve 
meets the LM line in the negative territory of nominal interest rates. An increase in money supply 
does not the power to shift the LM curve because, as stated above, bonds do not dominate cash, 
and money serves as a store of value.
Source: Author’s chart
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Figure 5- Negative-interest rate policy
 The monetarist perspective, advocated by Milton Friedman and Karl Schwatz, among 
others, argues that the existence of liquidity trap is conditional on the term structure of interest 
rates exhibiting zero or near-zero rates over the whole spectrum from short-term to long-term 
durations. Non-zero interest rates anywhere along the yield curve would preclude the formation of 
liquidity traps. The monetarist criticism of the Keynesian view is understandable given its strong 
advocacy for expansionary monetary policies during recessions. Similarly, the Austrian School of 
Economics contends that the analysis of the liquidity trap is founded on the wrong premise that 
the loan rate of interest represents the rate of interest, when the former is rather based on the 
natural rate of interest. The loan rate is an increasing function of the natural rate of interest, and 
the loan rate is not bound to rise if the natural rate of interest is not expected to increase. Thus 
with the aim of providing loans to businesses, central banks artificially lower interest rates by 
increasing the money supply during depressions. It is the credit expansion that distorts investment 
decisions by encouraging bad investment projects. It affects consumer preferences as well given 
the propensity of individuals to hoard money based on expectations of deflationary pressures. 
Rothbard (2001, [1963]) argues that the liquidity trap should not be explained by the flatness 
of the demand for money under certain interest levels, but by the rigidity of price levels. Thus, 
the solution does not lie in the conduct of expansionary monetary or fiscal policies but in the 
elimination of price rigidities and better functioning of market forces. 
 Rothbard (2001) presents a serious critique of the Keynesian approach to liquidity preference, 
stating that “[t]he use of mathematical functions, which are reversible at will, is appropriate in 
physics, where we do not know the causes of the observed movements. Since we do not know 
the causes, any mathematical law explaining or describing movements will be reversible, and, as 
far as we are concerned, any of the variables in the function is just as much “cause” as another. 
Source: Author’s chart
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In praxeology, the science of human action, however, we know the original cause—motivated 
action by individuals. This knowledge provides us with true axioms. From these axioms, true laws 
are deduced. They are deduced step by step in a logical, cause-and-effect relationship. Since first 
causes are known, their consequent effects are also known. Economics therefore traces unilinear 
cause-and-effect relations, not vague “mutually deter-mining” relations.” (pp. 785–786).
 Krugman (2000) further argues that “[b]ecause the usual rules do not apply, conventional rules 
of thumb about policy become hard to justify. We usually imagine that policy is more or less based 
on conventional models—in particular, that normally policy will be based on the simple, rather 
dull models in the textbooks rather than exotic stories that might be true but probably aren’t. In 
the case of the liquidity trap, however, conventional textbook models imply unconventional policy 
conclusions—for inflation targeting is not an exotic idea but the natural implication of both IS-
LM and modern intertemporal models applied to this unusual situation.” (p. 237).
 In light of the above theoretical discussion about the liquidity preference and analytical 
modelling, there are major difficulties in formulating a coherent theory of liquidity trap.  The trap 
itself is an overdue realization that the economy was permitted entry to but no exit from difficult 
monetary policies and market conditions. The reality remains that the phenomenon of liquidity 
trap is not new. But the clear inability of monetary policies in many advanced economies to reach 
inflation targets despite immense increases in money supply, inevitably draws attention to the 
limits of economic theory, and important questions about the essence of interest rates and the 
soundness and effectiveness of conventional monetary policies.
4. Balance-sheet recessions and expansionary monetary policies
It is important to understand the relation between the onset of financial crises, the ensuing 
economic recessions, and the accommodative monetary policies, which may be conducive in turn, 
to liquidity traps. In light of the formation of the Japanese and U.S. asset bubbles, it is clear 
that cutting interest rates and providing liquidity does not solve the underlying problems related 
to market efficiency and moral hazard. As noted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
(2011), the so-called “Greenspan put” or “asymmetric policy—allowing unrestrained growth, 
then working hard to cushion the impact of a bust—raised the question of “moral hazard”: did 
the policy encourage investors and financial institutions to gamble because their upside was 
unlimited while the full power and influence of the Fed protected their downside (at least against 
catastrophic losses)? Greenspan himself warned about this in a speech, noting that higher asset 
prices were “in part the indirect result of investors accepting lower compensation for risk” and 
cautioning that “newly abundant liquidity can readily disappear.” ” (p. 61). Thus, the real problem 
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is the creation of incentives and monetary environment for the accumulation of debt, and the 
failure to restrain the formation of asset bubbles. Given the widespread understanding that central 
banks cannot intentionally burst asset bubbles without inflicting damage to the economy, strong 
moral hazard is developed by providing investors with a put option against losses. The put option 
constitutes a protection against the risk of the bubble bursting, with guarantee from the central 
bank that capital markets would be allowed to function under all conditions. 
 Richard Koo (2014) argues that balance sheet recessions occur only when asset bubbles 
financed by debt finally burst. During such recessions, the focus of the private sector, whether 
firms or households, is on the repair of badly structured balance sheets. Given the formation of 
asset bubbles with the accumulation of debt and higher leverage, it is natural that acute problems 
of deleveraging ensue in the aftermath of the bubble burst. The deleveraging process can take 
place in terms of debt-equity swaps, debt forgiveness, or capital injections. Unlike the usually rapid 
process of debt accumulation, deleveraging is rather time-consuming. Thus, insofar that the issue 
of liquidity trap is concerned, the key question is whether households and companies concerned 
with long-protracted deleveraging efforts, are willing to increase borrowing and investment just 
because interest rates are falling.
 It seems that numerous efforts to stimulate the economy by providing liquidity and lowering 
interest rates to encourage real investment have been so far ineffective. With reference to Table 
2, the equilibrium levels of interest rates are theoretically determined by the forces of supply and 
demand of credit. In the textbook explanations of cases [1] and [2], positive equilibrium rates are 
conditional on the presence of sufficient demand. Market rates may approach policy rates in the 
presence of sufficient supply (case [1]), and would exceed policy rates under insufficient supply 
(case [2]). Much of the theoretical analysis and empirical research in the academia and policy-
making circles have centered so far on these particular textbook cases, perhaps because of the lack 
of experience with acute balance-sheet recessions, economic depressions, and liquidity traps. In 
the aftermath of the U.S. financial crisis, there is a recourse to unconventional monetary measures, 
including zero-interest rate policies as well as quantitative and qualitative easing programs.
Table 2- Balance-sheet recession and the determination of interest rates
Supply of Credit (Lending-Saving)
Yes No
Demand for  
Credit 
(Borrowing-
Investment)
Yes
[1]  Equilibrium positive interest rates 
(sufficient supply and demand)
[2]  Market rates exceed policy rates 
(sufficient demand but insufficient 
supply)
No
[3]  Ultra-low, zero-negative interest 
rates (sufficient supply but 
insufficient demand)
[4]  Zero-negative interest rates 
(insufficient supply and demand)
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 The ultra-low interest rates are theoretically the outcome of weak demand for credit, despite 
the provision of ample liquidity (case [3]). It can be argued that the accommodative monetary 
policies adopted by monetary policy-makers in the major advanced economies have prevented the 
more extreme scenario of not only insufficient demand but insufficient supply as well (case [4]). 
Thus, it appears that near-zero interest rates and negative bond yields may be inevitable under 
the particular conditions [3] and [4] of weak demand for credit. It is important to note that these 
conditions are consistent with a balance-sheet recession with the private sector, as noted above, is 
more concerned about the deleveraging process leading to weaker demand for credit, despite the 
expansionary monetary policies. Thus, balance-sheet recessions are conducive to liquidity traps, 
and further monetary easing in the presence of weak demand for credit may not be part of viable 
solutions.
 With reference to Figure 6, there is a clear convergence of policy rates in major advanced 
economies toward the zero-threshold in association with the U.S. financial crisis. Given its 
experience in the early 1990s with post-bubble recession, it is the Bank of Japan that pioneered 
the use of unconventional monetary policy to stimulate the economy. The European Central 
Bank, Federal Reserve Bank and Bank of England policymakers followed the concerted actions of 
adopting unprecedented monetary policies at the onset of the U.S. credit crisis, which culminated 
in policy rates dropping to near-zero levels. To better understand the dynamics of this competitive 
race to the bottom, it is important to note the earlier explicit commitment in April 1999 to the 
zero-interest rate policy. In an account of the unconventional policy measures adopted by the 
Bank of Japan to contain deflationary pressures, Ueda (2012) argues that the zero-interest rate 
policy and quantitative easing were aimed at managing expectations regarding future policy rates, 
purchase of assets in dysfunctional markets, portfolio rebalancing, and inflation of the balance 
sheets of central banks.
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Figure 6- Monetary easing under near-zero interest rates
Source:  Author’s chart based on BIS policy rate statistics
 As noted by Shirai (2013), the commitment by the Bank of Japan, to zero-interest rate policy 
until deflationary concerns are dispelled, can be regarded as an open-ended forward guidance. 
The uncollateralized overnight call rate was however raised in August 2000 in the absence of 
clear evidence of inflationary pressures or expectations of higher inflation. The Bank of Japan 
reintroduced the zero-interest rate policy in March 2001 and made another commitment to 
pursue monetary easing until “the inflation rate becomes stably above zero.” In replacement of the 
call rate, a target for bank reserves held at the Bank of Japan, or current account balances held by 
financial institutions at the Bank, became the main instrument for money market operations. The 
quantitative easing policies introduced in March 2001 was aimed at providing further liquidity to 
the financial system.
 A more comprehensive monetary easing introduced in October 2010 expands asset purchases 
to a wider range of securities including long-term Japanese government bonds. The renewed 
commitment to monetary easing was manifested by the official statement that quantitative easing 
would continue until the core CPI registers stable zero or an increase year on year. As noted by 
Shirai (2013), this is state-contingent forward guidance about the future course of monetary 
policy. This guidance was further explained in October 2003 with the clarification that monetary 
easing shall be pursued until the most recently published core CPI registers zero percent or above, 
and that it is not expected to fall below zero.
 Further commitment was made by the Bank of Japan in October 2010 to implement 
comprehensive monetary easing policy through a second round of quantitative easing with 
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asset purchases extending to assets other than long-tern government bonds. Forward guidance 
indicates that monetary easing would be maintained until price stability is expected based on an 
“understanding” from the Bank’s monetary policy board about the core CPI ranging from zero 
to two percent, with one percent as the distributional central tendency. Further clarification was 
made in February 2012 about the board’s “understanding” in terms of one percent “goal”, which 
can be distinguished from inflation “target”, with the focus placed on inflation expectations rather 
than statistical outcome. Finally, it is noted that further guidance is provided with the inception 
of quantitative and qualitative easing with a negative interest rates in January 2016. The Bank 
of Japan applies a three-tier system of positive, zero and negative interest rates to the current 
accounts held by financial institutions at the Bank, which provides notice that further cuts in 
interest rate into negative territory may be implemented if judged necessary.
 The objective of these unconventional and unprecedented measures is to achieve the price 
stability target of two percent. But, the inflation target seems to be increasingly elusive, and the 
liquidity trap increasingly perplexing. The Keynesian solution to liquidity traps includes fiscal 
stimulus to create new job opportunities and facilitate the formation of higher expectations 
about the marginal efficiency of capital. The role for central banks is to reduce the cost of capital, 
volatility of interest rates, and attitudes toward risk and uncertainty by risk-averse investors. But 
the reality is that perhaps the problem falls beyond the domain of central banks and the capacity 
of their inflated balance sheets to absorb the impact of balance-sheet recessions.
5. Conclusion
After few decades of low inflation, weak productivity, poor economic growth, and limited room for 
manoeuver, it seems that unconventional monetary policies are not sufficient to solve the prevailing 
economic problems. Despite the fact that forward guidance provides greater clarity about the 
future course of non-traditional monetary policies and exit strategies from quantitative easing, 
low inflation persists and inflation targets remain elusive. As a natural result of the unprecedented 
policy measures to provide liquidity to the financial system, central bankers continue to inflate 
their own balance sheets. Given the growing economic and geo-political uncertainties and the 
onset of the new coronavirus crisis, micro-prudential supervision at a time of increased private 
and public debt may not be sufficient to reduce systemic risk and ensure financial stability.
 Central banks are expected to play a pivotal role in resolving the dilemma associated with 
low economic growth, low inflation and weaker growth in real income. But, in the absence of 
a more accurate and precise definition of price stability, the mandate of central banks remains 
unclear. Jean-Claude Trichet (2019) argues that structural reforms are important and that in order 
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to reach the two-percent level, it is incumbent on government, organized labour and firms to 
elevate the growth rate of unit-labour costs to an appropriate level consistent with the inflation 
target. The same line of argument is advanced by other economists including Pereira da Silva and 
Mojon (2019), who contend that social partners and governments should consider a “consensus 
package” based on increasing nominal wages and pro-growth fiscal stimulus. These notable 
recommendations for consensus packages and rising labour costs are deemed to be the necessary 
conditions to escape from low-inflation traps.
 Liquidity traps stem from the same sources including the accumulation of debt, increased 
leverage, moral hazards, misalignment of incentives, and the ensuing balance sheet recessions. 
In light of the failure to lift inflation rates above any reasonable threshold, it is perhaps crucial 
to realize that inflation, even on the longer run, is not, primarily or exclusively, determined by 
monetary policy. It is important to understand also that liquidity traps have exposed the limits of 
conventional and unconventional monetary policies based on the setting of positive or negative 
rates of interest independent form the rate of return on the real economy. Thus, the main 
challenges do not perhaps lie with inflation targeting, or the provision of liquidity independent 
of the rate of return in the real economy. The critical lessons should be drawn from the dynamics 
of the real economy, and from the fact that economic growth is function of demographic and 
social dynamics and technological advances. The lessons imply also a shift of foci away from 
nominal or real interest rates toward risk sharing, which can govern more efficiently the social and 
economic relations in a dynamic society and exchange economy, and provides the foundations for 
sustainable human and economic development. 
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